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As with most kinds of inner experience, it is difficult to assess actual self-talk frequency
beyond self-reports, given the often hidden and subjective nature of the phenomenon.
The Self-Talk Scale (STS; Brinthaupt et al., 2009) is a self-report measure of self-talk
frequency that has been shown to possess acceptable reliability and validity. However,
no research using the STS has examined the accuracy of respondents’ self-reports. In
the present paper, we report a series of studies directly examining the measurement of
self-talk frequency and functions using the STS. The studies examine ways to validate
self-reported self-talk by (1) comparing STS responses from 6 weeks earlier to recent
experiences that might precipitate self-talk, (2) using experience sampling methods
to determine whether STS scores are related to recent reports of self-talk over a
period of a week, and (3) comparing self-reported STS scores to those provided by
a significant other who rated the target on the STS. Results showed that (1) overall
self-talk scores, particularly self-critical and self-reinforcing self-talk, were significantly
related to reports of context-specific self-talk; (2) high STS scorers reported talking to
themselves significantly more often during recent events compared to low STS scorers,
and, contrary to expectations, (3) friends reported less agreement than strangers in their
self-other self-talk ratings. Implications of the results for the validity of the STS and for
measuring self-talk are presented.
Keywords: Self-Talk Scale, self-reports, inner experience, personality assessment, individual differences
Introduction
Conducting research on the psychology of inner experiences is an interesting and challenging activ-
ity. Because the phenomena of interest may be covert, hidden, or completely unobservable by an
outside agent, researchers must rely primarily on the introspection and self-reports of participants.
Several of the other papers in this special issue address ways to overcome some of the limitations of
and provide complements to self-report with respect to diﬀerent kinds of inner experiences. In the
present paper, we describe three studies designed to assess the accuracy of self-reported self-talk.
There is a long history of research interest in the veridicality of self-reports (e.g., Schoeneman,
1981; Shrauger and Osberg, 1981; Moskowitz, 1986; Brinthaupt and Erwin, 1992; Vazire and
Wilson, 2012). Interest in the accuracy of self-reports covers a broad range of phenomena,
particularly behaviors that might be expected to show socially desirable responding eﬀects.
For example, Gatersleben et al. (2002) found that self-reports of pro-environmental behaviors
were only weakly related to actual household energy use. In a meta-analysis of the validity of
self-reported drug use, Magura and Kang (1996) found that underreporting was a prevalent
issue. People have also been found to underestimate their frequency of sedentary behaviors
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(e.g., Klesges et al., 1990) and underestimate their dietary intake
(e.g., Palaniappan et al., 2003).
With respect to reporting about speciﬁc self-related phenom-
ena, the literature ﬁnds that self-reports of personality traits
generally show moderate agreement with observations from oth-
ers and behavioral indicators (e.g., Mehl et al., 2006; Vazire and
Mehl, 2008; Back et al., 2009). Research also suggests that peo-
ple are more accurate when reporting about personality disorders
than when reporting about mental disorders, possibly because
the former are seen as part of one’s self-deﬁnition and as not as
something that is unacceptable or a reﬂection of a disturbance
(e.g., Oltmanns andTurkheimer, 2006). Furthermore, in domains
that reﬂect more positive personal behaviors or characteristics,
research suggests that when people are uncertain, they are likely
to report or demonstrate having personality traits that are seen
by others as positive, such as prosocial characteristics (Chin et al.,
2012).
Research on maladaptive cognitive and aﬀective variables
supports the idea that self-reports are generally similar to
the reports of knowledgeable informants (e.g., South et al.,
2011), although some clinical issues, such as narcissistic per-
sonality disorder, appear to be particularly susceptible to self-
other disagreement (Klonsky et al., 2002). Carlson et al. (2013)
found that self-reports showed greater validity than informant
reports for internalizing personality disorders (such as show-
ing neuroticism, anxiety, or obsessive–compulsive tendencies).
Alternatively, they found that informant reports showed greater
validity than self-reports for personality disorders that are more
externalizing in nature (e.g., being disagreeable, aggressive, or
narcissistic).
Whereas self-talk appears to be primarily an internalizing
rather than externalizing phenomenon, it is unclear how people
perceive the appropriateness of their self-talk. Perceptions of self-
talk appropriateness are likely to diﬀer depending on whether we
consider the frequency of self-talk (e.g., how often people talk
to themselves) or its aﬀective (i.e., positive and negative) con-
tent. Researchers ﬁnd that people are frequently biased toward
self-enhancing self-perceptions, especially individuals who show
high levels of narcissism (Schriber and Robins, 2012). However,
it is unclear the extent to which self-talk is seen as a socially
desirable or undesirable characteristic. Brinthaupt et al. (2009)
found that self-reported self-talk was only weakly related to a
measure of social desirability. That ﬁnding suggests that self-talk
frequency may not be seen in a particularly negative way among
respondents.
Maladaptive or dysfunctional self-talk content – unrealistic,
irrational, or excessively negative – has been a focus of cognitive-
behavioral therapists for many years (e.g., Beck, 1976; Glass and
Arnkoﬀ, 1994). An implication of this focus is that certain kinds
of self-talk may be seen by people as less socially desirable. If this
is the case, then the accuracy of certain kinds of self-reported
self-talk, such as self-critical self-statements, may be negatively
associated with perceptions of inappropriateness or social unde-
sirability. More positive or aﬀectively neutral self-talk, such as
self-managing self-statements, should be less strongly related to
those perceptions. People’s reports of the frequency of diﬀerent
kinds of self-talk might therefore be aﬀected by their beliefs or
presuppositions about how maladaptive or dysfunctional it is
(Hurlburt and Heavey, 2015).
Self-talk frequency is related to awide variety of self-regulatory
behaviors (e.g., Mischel et al., 1996; Carver and Scheier, 1998;
Leary, 2004). With the increasing interest in self-talk as a psy-
chological phenomenon across multiple domains (Beck, 1976;
Kendall et al., 1989; Hardy et al., 2009; Winsler et al., 2009;
Hurlburt et al., 2013), it is crucial that data be collected that exam-
ine the accuracy of self-reported self-talk. Among the important
questions here include (1) the extent that people’s reports of their
self-talk frequency correspond to actual behavioral instances of
self-talk across a variety of everyday situations or circumstances
and (2) whether people’s awareness of their self-talk reﬂects
their self-reported frequency of self-talk instances, as assessed at
diﬀerent times, or through diﬀerent kinds of data collection.
Self-Talk and the Self-Talk Scale
The development and initial validation of the Self-Talk Scale
(STS; Brinthaupt et al., 2009) permits researchers to examine
individual diﬀerences in self-talk frequency. The STS is general
measure of self-talk that is applicable to a broad range of self-
regulatory behaviors and situations. The scale consists of 16 items
rated on a ﬁve-point frequency scale (1 = never, 5 = very often)
using the common stem “I talk to myself when. . .” Brinthaupt
et al. (2009) showed that the STS has a structure consisting of one
higher-order factor (overall self-talk) and four primary factors
(self-critical, self-reinforcing, self-managing, and social-assessing
self-talk), along with acceptable test–retest stability and internal
consistency.
Self-critical self-talk is generally associated with negative
events (e.g., “I feel ashamed of something I’ve done” or
“Something bad has happened to me”). Self-reinforcing self-talk
focuses on positive events (e.g., “I’m really happy for myself”
or “I’m proud of something I’ve done”). Self-managing self-talk
pertains to general self-regulation (e.g., “I’m mentally exploring
a possible course of action” or “I’m giving myself instructions
or directions about what I should do or say”). Finally, social-
assessing self-talk refers to people’s social interactions (e.g., “I
want to replay something that I’ve said to another person” or “I
want to analyze something that someone recently said to me”).
In their STS validation work, Brinthaupt et al. (2009) found
negative relationships between social-assessing and self-critical
self-talk and self-esteem, as well as a positive association between
self-reinforcing self-talk and self-esteem. Frequent self-talkers
(i.e., those scoring in the upper quartile on the total STS) also
scored higher than infrequent self-talkers (lowest quartile) on
need for cognition and obsessive–compulsive tendencies.
Additional research using the STS shows more frequent self-
talk among adults who reported having had an imaginary com-
panion in childhood or who grew up as an only child compared
to those who did have those experiences (Brinthaupt and Dove,
2012) and a high negative correlation between loneliness and
mental health in more frequent self-talkers (Reichl et al., 2013).
Research using an adaptation of the STS (Shi et al., 2015) has
found that individuals with high public speaking anxiety were
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cognitively “busier” (i.e., reported higher levels of several kinds
of self-talk) than those with low anxiety as they prepared for
an upcoming speech. Finally, research has supported the use of
the STS response format and the use of the STS total score as a
unidimensional measure of self-talk frequency (Brinthaupt and
Kang, 2014), as well as shown a similar factor structure in a
cross-cultural comparison (Khodayarifard et al., 2014).
In summary, the STS possesses good psychometric proper-
ties, and scores on the measure have been associated with a wide
range of interesting phenomena. Clearly, the scale shows promise
as a measure of self-reported self-talk. However, an important
question is to what extent the self-talk that STS respondents
report reﬂects their actual self-talk frequency. As Hurlburt and
Heavey (2015) have shown, respondents’ reports of any kind of
inner experience can be problematic, particularly when those
reports are retrospective. Previous reviews of self-talk measures
(e.g., Glass and Arnkoﬀ, 1994; Uttl et al., 2011) propose that
validity can be examined through the use of multiple measures
and assessment occasions. There are several interesting theo-
retical and research implications related to the analysis of the
accuracy of self-reported self-talk and to the diﬀerent self-talk
functions. In this paper, we report the results of three stud-
ies examining the correspondence between self-reports of self-
talk using the STS and behavioral or observer indicators of
self-talk. In addition, we examine the four STS sub-scales and
how these are associated with diﬀerent levels of accuracy or
agreement.
Study 1: STS Scores and Recent
Self-Talk Experiences
As with other domains of personality self-knowledge (Back and
Vazire, 2012), the accuracy of self-reports of one’s self-talk fre-
quency is likely to be aﬀected by explicit and implicit information
processing, the salience of relevant behavioral instances, accessi-
bility to ongoing inner experiences, and information from other
people (Hurlburt et al., 2013). It is likely that people rely on a
wide variety of information sources and presuppositions when
completing the STS. We would expect that respondents who
notice or recall more situations in which they have talked to
themselves in the past should be likely to report more frequent
self-talk. Assuming that people respond to the STS based on an
aggregation of behavioral instances, cognitive heuristics, presup-
positions, times, and situations associated with self-talk (Kenrick
and Funder, 1988; Hurlburt et al., 2013), self-talk likelihood in
sample situational instances should be positively associated with
self-reports of typical self-talk.
In Study 1, participants ﬁrst completed the STS and then, at
a later time, completed a revised version of the measure. We
expected that, if the STS assesses respondents’ awareness of or
assumptions about their typical self-talk frequency, then high
STS scorers would report being more likely than low STS scorers
to talk to themselves when speciﬁc STS-related situations occur.
Thus, we predicted that previous overall and subscale STS scores,
based on how often people report typically talking to themselves,
would be positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with their reports




Through the cooperation of three faculty members from human
sciences, speech, and English departments, 83 students (27 men,
56 women) from a large southeastern U. S. public university
completed the materials. Students’ ages ranged between 18 and
31 years (M = 20.01, SD = 2.23). For two of the instructors, stu-
dents completed the surveys during their normal class time, with
the other instructor permitting students to complete the mea-
sures outside of class and returning them at the next class period.
Students volunteered to participate, completed an informed con-
sent form, and received a small number of extra credit points for
their participation at the discretion of their instructors. This study
(as well as Studies 2 and 3 reported later) received IRB approval
prior to data collection.
Materials
Students completed the original STS early in the academic term
and then, approximately 6 weeks later, completed a revised ver-
sion of the measure. STS internal consistency coeﬃcients were
acceptable for the overall scale (r = 0.92) and the subscale (rs
ranging from 0.79 to 0.87). For the modiﬁed, “recent experience”
version of the STS (reSTS), participants indicated whether they
had recently experienced any of the 16 situations from the orig-
inal STS, as well as whether they had engaged in self-talk during
those experiences. The reSTS wording of the items was modi-
ﬁed from the original STS to reﬂect the past-tense nature of the
question posed. For example, we changed the original STS item
“I want to replay something I’ve said to another person” to “I
wanted to replay something I said to another person” for the
reSTS. Wording was only changed as much as necessary to make
the items grammatically correct in the past tense. The order of the
items in the reSTS was the same as the original STS.
Participants received the following instructions for completing
the reSTS: “check all that apply; over the past 2 days, I have been
in a situation where. . .” They rated the 16 items corresponding to
the STS items (e.g., “Something good happened to me” and “I was
really upset with myself”) in terms of whether that situation had
occurred (yes/no). For each situation that had occurred, students
then indicated (yes/no) whether they had talked to themselves
“(either silently or aloud) about that situation as it occurred or
shortly after it occurred.” From these data, we calculated the
total number of STS-related situations that had occurred over
the past 2 days (possible range 0–16), the number of situations
that had occurred for each of the four STS subscales (possible
range 0–4), and the total and subscale ratios of situations where
students reported talking to themselves when those situations
had occurred (possible range 0.000–1.000). For the latter subscale
ratios, when no instances of subscale situations occurred, values
were set to missing.
Procedure
As noted earlier, participants received materials twice in a
semester during regular class time. At the ﬁrst session, they
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received a consent form, a paper copy of the STS, and a demo-
graphic form that included questions about age and gender.
Students also included their student ID numbers on the form,
in order to permit matching of data from the second session.
At the second data collection period, we visited the same class-
rooms, and the participating students completed the reSTS on
paper. After the data from the second session were collected, we
thanked and debriefed the participants. The surveys, including
the consent form, took no more than 10 min to complete.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the reSTS measures.
These data indicate that, in the 2-day period used for assessment,
approximately 67% of the 16 STS situations had occurred. Of
these situations, self-managing ones were most frequent, whereas
self-critical were least frequent. The data also indicated that
participants reported self-talk associated with over 80% of STS
situations that had occurred. The self-talk ratio was highest for
the self-managing and lowest for the self-reinforcing situations.
These data support the idea that there are numerous daily oppor-
tunities for people to talk to themselves and that they frequently
report doing so when they encounter those situations.
Table 2 provides the correlations among the major measures
for both testing sessions. As the table indicates, STS total scores
were positively correlated with the reSTS overall ratio. In other
words, frequent self-talkers reported talking to themselves more
often than infrequent self-talkers when STS-related situations
recently occurred. Each of the STS subscales were also posi-
tively and signiﬁcantly related to their corresponding reSTS ratio
scores, with the self-critical and self-reinforcing scores show-
ing stronger relationships than the self-managing and social-
assessing scores. In addition, STS total scores were positively
related to the total number of STS situations that had occurred
in the previous 2 days, r(81) = 0.395, p< 0.001.
These data provide good support for the expectation that typ-
ical self-reported self-talk scores, assessed 6 weeks earlier, would
TABLE 1 | Study 1: Descriptive statistics for reSelf-Talk Scale (STS)
measures.
Item Mean SD n
reSTS event frequency
Overall 10.78 3.66 83
Self-critical 2.04 1.44 83
Self-reinforcing 2.70 1.36 83
Self-managing 3.10 1.10 83
Social-assessing 2.95 1.20 83
reSTS self-talk ratio
Overall 0.815 0.249 83
Self-critical 0.782 0.363 71
Self-reinforcing 0.695 0.394 74
Self-managing 0.870 0.272 83
Social-assessing 0.810 0.334 80
reSTS refers to revised STS items; event frequency refers to the number of STS-
related situations (out of 16 for overall, out of four for each subscale) that had
occurred; self-talk ratio refers to the proportion of instances of STS situations
that had occurred in which participants reported that associated self-talk had also
occurred.
correspond to self-reports of recent examples of instances where
self-talk could occur. There are at least two possible explanations
for these results. First, general assessments of people’s typical self-
talk frequency are an accurate representation of the frequency
with which they actually talk to themselves across a variety of
speciﬁc and recent self-regulatory situations. For example, people
who report that they frequently talk to themselves when some-
thing bad or good happens to them also report having done so
when something bad or good has recently happened. Second, it is
possible that people customarily recall salient examples of self-
talk (e.g., within the previous few days) when they assess the
frequency of their typical self-talk using the STS. If this recall
pattern occurs, then we have simply assessed the situations that
respondents are already relying on when they rate their typical
self-talk patterns using the original STS.
The fact that STS scores were signiﬁcantly associated
with the occurrence of STS-related situations suggests that
frequent self-talkers are more aware of or responsive to a variety
of self-regulatory situations than infrequent self-talkers. Perhaps
self-talk frequency is positively associated with a greater overall
sensitivity to one’s intrapersonal and interpersonal experiences.
Of course, we cannot determine the extent to which participants
were recalling their previous STS responses when rating their self-
talk in recent situations. If they were able to recall their earlier STS
responses and were motivated to be consistent, then this could
account for the observed relationships. Future research could
address these possible explanations.
In summary, Study 1 provided data to suggest that (1) the
self-talk situations included in the STS are frequently reported
occurrences in people’s lives, (2) self-talk is reported to frequently
occur in those situations, and (3) respondents’ self-reports of
their typical self-talk generally agree with their reports about
speciﬁc related experiences. Although these results were encour-
aging, a variety of alternative explanations could not be addressed
or controlled in this study.
Study 2: Experience Sampling Study of
Current Ongoing Self-Talk
A limitation of Study 1 is that participants’ recall of relevant
instances and their accompanying self-talk was based on events
from the past 48 h. Because of the time lag involved, the extent










Overall 0.446∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗
Self-critical 0.377∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.231 0.332∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗
Self-reinforcing 0.412∗∗∗ 0.202 0.439∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗
Self-managing 0.231∗ 0.134 0.170 0.257∗ 0.225∗
Social-assessing 0.323∗∗ 0.221∗ 0.218 0.371∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; reSTS ratio refers to the proportion of
instances of STS situations that had occurred in which participants reported that
associated self-talk had also occurred.
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of agreement between original STS scores and recent instances
of self-reported self-talk may have been constrained. A stronger
test of the self-report accuracy question would involve very recent
experiences that should be more salient and accessible to the
participants.
The experience sampling method (ESM) has proven to be a
reliable and valid method for measuring a wide range of inner
experiences (Csikszentmihalyi and Larson, 2014). In Study 2,
we utilized ESM methods to compare general STS reports with
the self-talk that is reported to occur in response to current
experiences. In particular, we examined the self-talk patterns of
those who fell in the upper and lower quartiles of the STS total
scores. These self-reported frequent and infrequent self-talkers
were prompted periodically on their smart phones for 5 days to
indicate whether any of the 16 STS situations had occurred within
the past 2 h. If so, they then reported whether or not they had
talked to themselves about that instance.
We expected that, when instances of STS-related situations
occurred, previously identiﬁed frequent self-talkers would report
more accompanying self-talk than would the infrequent self-
talkers. In other words, across the array of situations included in
the STS, more overall and subscale self-talk should be reported




Using data collected approximately 1 month earlier from the
university’s General Psychology pretesting research pool, we
recruited 35 participants (8 male, 27 female) from the upper
(n = 20) and lower (n = 15) quartiles of total STS scores. The
lower quartile participants (M = 19.93, SD = 6.46) diﬀered sig-
niﬁcantly on STS scores from the upper quartile participants
(M = 50.70, SD = 5.39), t(33) = 15.34, p < 0.001. Participants
ranged in age from 18 to26 years (M = 18.66, SD = 1.78). With
respect to ethnicity, 74% of the participants were Caucasian and
11% were African–American. In order to participate in the study,
students were required to possess an operable smart phone that
could receive text messages and connect to the Internet.
Materials and Procedure
Using a modiﬁed version of the STS, we asked participants about
their very recent or currently ongoing activities and whether
those activities were associated with a self-reported instance of
self-talk. Due to software limitations, the order of the questions
was the same as the original STS. We modiﬁed the STS items in
two key ways for this study. First, each item included the phrase
“Over the last two hours, I have been in a situation where. . .” Care
was taken to change only what was necessary to match tense for
the complete phrase. Second, participants simply answered yes or
no to whether each of the 16 situations had recently occurred.
For items answered yes, a follow-up yes/no question appeared:
“Did you talk to yourself (either silently or aloud) during or
immediately after the situation occurred?”
We used a commercial survey hosting web-service to admin-
ister materials and organize response data. A free Gmail account
and a paid account to Right Inbox scheduled the text mes-
sages. Right Inbox is a web-browser extension that allows e-mail
drafts in the Gmail web-based e-mail client to automatically send
themselves at scheduled times. Over a 5-day period, participants
received 25 text message prompts (ﬁve each day) during a 10-h
daily period (10 am–8 pm). Participants used the same assigned
number to identify themselves at the start of each of the surveys.
There were 32 possible yes/no questions on each survey text
prompt. Possible scores on these measures ranged between 0–16
for the ﬁrst questions (situations that had recently occurred) and
the follow-up (talking to oneself if the situation had occurred).
Thus, over the course of the study, there were 400 possible
instances where an STS situation could have occurred and where
participants could have reported talking to themselves. As in
Study 1, we calculated the total and subscale ratios of situations
where students reported talking to themselves when those situ-
ations had occurred (possible range 0.000–1.000). For the latter
subscale ratios, when no instances of situations occurred, values
were set to missing.
A random number generator provided scheduled times for
contacting research participants. Twenty-ﬁve numbers between
0 and 119 were selected at random, and the corresponding num-
ber of minutes was added to the start time for each of the ﬁve
2-h blocks. For example, a 63 selected for a 10 am–12 pm block
would add 63 min to the 10 am start time, so that the text mes-
sage would be scheduled to be sent at 11:03 am. In the selection of
these contact times, we ensured that no two consecutive prompt
times occurred within 30 min of each other.
E-mails were converted to text messages using standardized
e-mail addresses issued by cell phone carriers to each phone num-
ber. Standard format for an assigned “e-mail to SMS” e-mail
address is the 10 digits of the phone number “at” a domain
hosted by the carrier. For example, a Verizon phone number,
(931) 555-1234, can receive as text messages any e-mail sent
to 9315551234@vtext.com. We recorded the appropriate text
message addresses for all research participants and sent a pilot
message before the study began in order to identify and correct
any address issues.
Each unique link that led to the survey directed participants
to a new “collector,” or a new identiﬁable instance of the survey.
This allowed data from each of the 25 surveys to remain separate
from one another, while the participant’s ID number allowed us to
collate these data. Additionally, time signatures on each collector
allowed for sorting the data by time-order.
At an orientation session at the start of the study, we briefed
participants on the details of the ESM, including the scheduling
of the text messages and that surveys would need to be com-
pleted online and within 2 h of receiving the link to each survey.
Each participant provided their phone number and carrier for
receiving text messages. After initial testing of the text message
system and phone compatibility, students received links to sur-
veys through text messages, beginning the following Monday.
Participants agreed to receive ﬁve text messages a day for ﬁve
consecutive days. All students participated during the same 5-day
period and received all text messages at the same intervals.
The links in the text messages directed participants to a survey
hosted on a commercial survey website. Surveys remained open
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for 2 h after receiving the text message link. This gave partici-
pants some ﬂexibility in answering the survey without allowing
excessive overlap of reporting periods. After 2 h, the link instead
directed participants to a page explaining that the survey was
closed.
Over the 2 weeks following the testing week, participants
returned for debrieﬁng and to receive credit for participating
in the study. The exit survey included demographic items (ID
number, age, gender, and ethnicity) and a yes/no question about
whether they had ever considered their level of self-talk prior
to the study. In addition, participants rated seven items regard-
ing their experiences during the ESM study, using a ﬁve-point
scale (1 = very little, 5 = very much). These items included
the diﬃculty in determining and recalling whether self-talk had
occurred when prompted, the diﬃculty of completing the survey
on time, whether the study questions and directions were clear,
whether the survey responses captured most daily instances of
self-talk, and whether their awareness of self-talk increased after
participating in the study.
Results and Discussion
Results showed that participants took an average of 20.32 min
(SD = 24.74) to respond to the receipt of the text messages.
Frequent and infrequent self-talkers did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
on this measure [t(34) = 0.186, p = 0.85]. Participants reported
that approximately 23% of the 400 possible STS-related situations
had occurred (M = 91.46, SD = 47.02) over the 5-day period.
In addition, participants reported talking to themselves 65% of
the time when the overall STS-related situations had occurred.
With respect to the STS subscales, participants reported talking to
themselves 72% of the time for the self-critical and self-managing
situations, 63% for the social-assessing situations, and 51% for the
self-reinforcing events.
Data for the major measures by frequent and infrequent self-
talkers are presented in Table 3. As the table shows, the groups
did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly on the number of STS-related sit-
uations that had occurred over the 5 days or the number of
TABLE 3 | Study 2: Comparison of infrequent and frequent self-talkers on
major measures.
Infrequent (n = 15) Frequent (n = 20)
Mean SD Mean SD t p
# of STS situations 81.73 54.92 98.75 40.05 1.061 0.296
# of situations
w/self-talk
53.60 54.37 76.85 43.14 1.411 0.167
Self-Talk Ratio
Overall 0.538 0.253 0.734 0.216 2.465 0.019
Self-critical 0.632 0.269 0.779 0.236 1.722 0.094
Self-reinforcing 0.355 0.320 0.619 0.221 2.889 0.007
Self-managing 0.598 0.317 0.808 0.193 2.431 0.021
Social-assessing 0.586 0.371 0.655 0.339 0.558 0.581
Self-talk ratio refers to the proportion of instances of STS situations that had
occurred in which participants reported that associated self-talk had also occurred.
Reported ratio values reflect the average of the proportions for the individual
members of each group.
those situations in which self-talk was reported to have occurred.
These results suggest that the everyday experiences related to the
topics included in the STS are similar for frequent and infre-
quent self-talkers. However, as expected, frequent self-talkers
reported a signiﬁcantly higher overall proportion of talking to
themselves when STS situations had occurred than did infre-
quent self-talkers. Examination of the STS subscales showed
that frequent self-talkers diﬀered signiﬁcantly from infrequent
self-talkers in their reports of self-reinforcing and self-managing
self-talk. Infrequent self-talkers reported being least likely to talk
to themselves during self-reinforcing situations, whereas frequent
self-talkers reported being most likely to talk to themselves in
response to self-managing situations.
The ﬁnal analyses examined the post-study survey data and
how participating in the study aﬀected people’s attention to their
self-talk. Twenty-seven of the 35 participants (13 infrequent, 14
frequent self-talkers) completed this survey. With respect to hav-
ing ever considered their level of self-talk prior to the study,
67% of the infrequent self-talkers reported no and 62% of the
frequent self-talkers reported yes [X2(1) = 1.99, p = 0.158).
The two groups did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly on any of the sur-
vey measures. Thus, the participants’ reports of their study
experiences were similar regardless of their self-talk frequency
status.
In summary, there was little evidence that the frequent and
infrequent self-talkers diﬀered in how often STS-related situa-
tions occurred during the 5 days of the study or that the two
groups experienced the study methodology diﬀerently. However,
frequent self-talkers reported being signiﬁcantly more likely to
talk to themselves when those situations occurred than did the
infrequent self-talkers. This result provides additional support for
the validity of the STS and of individuals’ self-reports of their
typical self-talk frequency.
It is interesting that the infrequent self-talkers (as identi-
ﬁed by their scores on the STS from the previous month)
reported talking to themselves when STS situations occurred
nearly 54% of the time. This is higher than the percentage of self-
talk frequency based on this group’s mean STS scores (19.93/64
or 31%). The frequent self-talkers reported talking to them-
selves when STS situations occurred 73% of the time, which
is very similar to their mean STS score percentage (50.70/64
or 79%). It appears that those who rate themselves as infre-
quent self-talkers still report talking to themselves around half
of the times shortly after STS-related situations occur, but that
they under-report that frequency when completing the STS. It
is also possible that there was a regression to the mean eﬀect
for the infrequent and frequent self-talkers. Because we selected
lower- and upper-quartile STS scorers for the groups, their
later situation-speciﬁc self-talk reports might be more likely to
increase (decrease).
Our methodology in Studies 1 and 2 did not permit an
assessment of the amount of time spent talking to oneself when
STS situations occurred. We only asked participants to indicate
whether they had talked to themselves in response to the situa-
tion occurring. Future research could examine the length, depth,
or salience of one’s self-talk following the occurrence of these sit-
uations. Frequent self-talkers would be expected to show large
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diﬀerences on these self-talk characteristics compared to infre-
quent self-talkers. It is possible that degree of cognitive processing
of events contributes more to people’s general assessments of their
self-talk frequency (and whether they are categorized as frequent
or infrequent self-talkers) than the occurrence of situations that
prompt self-talk.
The ﬁrst two studies provided good support for the prediction
that self-reports of typical self-talk frequency using the STS are
accurate. Analysis of the STS subscales revealed some interesting
qualiﬁcations to the general trend. Study 1 showed that all the
STS subscales were signiﬁcantly correlated with recent situations
(which had occurred within the past 2 days). However, Study
2 showed that frequent and infrequent self-talkers did not dif-
fer in their self-reported self-critical and social-assessing self-talk
frequency in speciﬁc situations that had occurred very recently.
It is possible that these categories of self-talk are more diﬃ-
cult to estimate accurately. It is noteworthy that both of these
subscales assess more negative than positive self-talk instances
(Brinthaupt et al., 2009). Individuals appear to be most accu-
rate in judging their typical self-reinforcing self-talk frequency.
Once again, research examining the length, depth, or salience
of one’s self-talk would provide important information about
the memorability of diﬀerent kinds of self-talk and how that
memorability contributes to assessments of one’s typical self-talk
frequency.
Study 3: Self and Other Ratings of
Self-Talk Frequency
Another way to examine the validity of self-reported self-talk is
to compare self-reports to the reports of knowledgeable others.
Unfortunately, there are several reasons why self-talk might not
be easy to monitor in another person. This task may be simi-
lar to comparing self- and other-reports of a person’s internal
physiological states (e.g., the severity of a headache and one’s
hunger status). In these cases, there is very little information that
an observer could rely on to provide an accurate assessment.
In addition, due to self-presentation or impression management
reasons (such as concerns about one’s “sanity”), both silent and
aloud self-talk are probably more likely to be used when a person
is alone than with others. By its very nature, self-talk is self-
directed speech that appears to not be intended for the ears of
other people. Due to issues of attention or focus, it may also
be more diﬃcult mechanically and socially to engage consis-
tently in self-talk in the presence of another person than when
alone. Thus, the ability for an observer to assess accurately the
self-talk frequency of a target person may be fundamentally
limited.
Despite the intrapersonal nature of self-talk, there is evidence
that there are interpersonal aspects of the phenomenon. For
example, research shows that children (and to a lesser extent
adults) will engage in more private speech when performing tasks
in the presence of others than when alone (McGonigle-Chalmers
et al., 2014). There may be times when people talk to themselves
(either silently or aloud) in the presence of others for strategic
reasons (e.g., to convey an emotional response or to indicate that
one is actively thinking about an issue). Thus, there appear to be
some interpersonal aspects of the inner experience of self-talk. If
this is true, then other people, particularly those with extensive
knowledge of and experience with the respondent, should show
high levels of agreement with that respondent’s self-reported
self-talk frequency.
There is research support for the idea that other people
can contribute to the accuracy of one’s self-views. For example,
Srivastava (2012) noted that personal attributes that are reputa-
tional in nature (such as social status or likeability) are strongly
aﬀected by how one is seen by others. Because covert or silent
self-talk is a highly internalized phenomenon, these results sug-
gest that self-reports of self-talk might be more valid than the
reports of informants. On the other hand, people who engage in
frequent private speech (out loud self-talk) may cue informants
about their likely inner speech (silent self-talk) frequency.
In the realm of personality pathology, South et al. (2011) found
that, with a community sample of married couples, as degree
of acquaintance increased, self-other agreement about extent of
pathology increased. As noted earlier, there is also a research liter-
ature on the tendency for individuals to rate themselves higher on
maladaptive cognitive and aﬀective variables than do those who
know them well. For example, there is a bias toward more favor-
able (less negative) other-reports than self-reports in the domain
of personality pathology (Vazire, 2010).
If self-talk is seen as a maladaptive behavioral characteristic,
then we would expect that people will self-report higher levels of
self-talk than what they will report for their partners. However,
as noted earlier, Brinthaupt et al. (2009) found that scores on
the STS were only weakly related to social desirability scores.
In addition, research shows that people generally use less pri-
vate speech and more inner speech as they move from childhood
to adulthood (Winsler and Naglieri, 2003; Duncan and Tarulli,
2009). Thus, adult self-talk tends to be hidden from others, which
should also create a tendency toward higher self-reported than
other-reported self-talk scores.
In Study 3, we examined the extent to which the reports
of others correspond with self-reported self-talk frequency. For
this study, pairs of participants, who either knew their part-
ner well or did not know their partner at all, rated them-
selves and the other on the STS as well as a measure of pri-
vate speech (out loud self-talk). The stranger data served as
the control condition, providing a baseline for what respon-
dents think about how often people in general normally talk
to themselves. We expected that close others would show
greater self-other agreement on self-talk frequency than would
strangers. We also expected that, for those who know each
other, increased relationship closeness would be associated with
increased levels of self-talk frequency agreement. These pre-
dictions are based on the assumption that greater relationship
closeness will provide partners with more situations where self-
talk might occur and more accurate information about how
often self-talk occurs, compared to strangers. Finally, because of
its greater observability, we expected stronger self-other agree-
ment results for private speech (i.e., out loud self-talk) than for
self-talk measured with the STS (i.e., both inner and private
speech).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 570
Brinthaupt et al. Self-reported self-talk
Method
Participants
Eighty-eight students (44 pairs) participated in the study.
Participants were drawn from the department’s General
Psychology research pool. They received course credit for their
participation. The sample includes 29 men and 59 women,
with an average age of 19.75 years (SD = 1.80). With respect to
ethnicity, 56% were Caucasian and 35% were African–American.
There were 26 pairs in the friends group (18 men, 34 women)
and 18 pairs (11 men, 25 women) in the stranger group. Eighteen
(69%) of the friend pairs were same-sex and nine (50%) of the
stranger pairs were same sex. Forty-two (81%) of the friend
group participants identiﬁed themselves as friends, siblings, or
roommates, with nine participants (17%) indicating an exclusive
or non-exclusive dating relationship.
Measures
Participants completed the STS and a measure of out loud pri-
vate speech for both themselves and another person, as well
as demographic items and partner ratings. The private speech
measure was Duncan and Cheyne’s (1999) Self-Verbalization
Questionnaire (SVQ). This is a 27-item measure of activities and
situations in which people might talk out loud to themselves.
The SVQ consists of four factors, including spatial-search (e.g.,
“I sometimes verbalize my thoughts when I’m searching for a
book in a library”), behavioral-organizational (e.g., “I sometimes
think out loud to myself when I’m trying to clean up a mess in
a big hurry”), cognitive-attentional (e.g., “I sometimes verbalize
my thoughts when I’m memorizing something for an exam”),
and aﬀective (e.g., “I sometimes verbalize my thoughts when I’m
feeling angry or upset about something”). Respondents rate the
items using a seven-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly
agree). Items are summed to create the subscale and total scores,
with possible total scores ranging from 27 to 189. We used only
the total scores for this study. The authors report acceptable reli-
ability and validity for the SVQ. In the current sample, the alpha
coeﬃcients for the overall SVQ were in the acceptable range for
both self-ratings (0.92) and other-ratings (0.93). The alpha coef-
ﬁcients for the overall STS were also in the acceptable range for
both self-ratings (0.89) and other-ratings (0.88).
To determine the accuracy of respondents’ self-reports, we
created an absolute percentage error (ape) score for the STS and
SVQ. The apeSTS was calculated as the absolute value of the dif-
ference between the partner’s rating of the participant’s STS score
and the participant’s self-reported STS score, divided by the par-
ticipant rating, and then multiplied by 100. The apeSVQ score
was calculated as the absolute value of the diﬀerence between
the partner’s rating of the participant’s SVQ score and the par-
ticipant’s self-reported SVQ score, divided by the participant
rating, and then multiplied by 100. A smaller ape score repre-
sented greater similarity in the ratings of the two partners. Similar
measures have been used by researchers to assess measurement
accuracy in other domains (e.g., Kang et al., 2012).
For the two self-talk measures, we also calculated a measure
of bias – the diﬀerence between the partner’s rating of the partic-
ipant’s STS or SVQ score and the participant’s self-reported STS
or SVQ score, divided by the participant rating, andmultiplied by
100 (biasSTS and biasSVQ, respectively). Bias scores in the pos-
itive direction indicated a bias toward reporting higher self-talk
scores for the other than for self. Finally, we calculated a sim-
ple diﬀerence score for each measure – the diﬀerence between
the partner’s score for the participant and the participant’s STS or
SVQ score (diﬀSTS and diﬀSVQ, respectively). Diﬀerence scores
in the positive direction reﬂected higher other-reported than
self-reported self-talk scores.
Demographic items included participant age, gender, and eth-
nicity. Participants in the signiﬁcant other condition indicated
the nature of the relationship with their friend/partner (e.g.,
friend, roommate, dating), whether they currently lived with this
person, and how long they had known them. Next, they indicated
howmuch time in an average day and an average week they spent
in the physical presence of their partner. Finally, participants in
both the signiﬁcant other and stranger conditions rated, using
ﬁve-point scales, how close they and their partner were (1 = not
close at all, 5 = extremely close), how well they knew their part-
ner (1 = not very well at all, 5 = extremely well), how well they
understood how their partner thinks about him/herself (1 = not
very well at all, 5 = extremely well), how well they would say that
their partner knows them (1 = does not know me very well at
all, 5 = knows me extremely well), and how well they would say
that their partner understands how they think about themselves
(1 = not very well at all, 5 = extremely well).
Procedure
Prior to the testing session, we informed participants in the signif-
icant other condition to bring a friend, romantic partner, or close
other with them in order to participate and receive course credit.
Participants in the stranger condition were randomly assigned a
partner at the start of the testing session.We collected data for the
two conditions in separate testing sessions, with all participants in
each session falling in the same condition. Participants ﬁrst com-
pleted the self-talk/private speech measures for themselves and




Participants in the friend group diﬀered signiﬁcantly from par-
ticipants in the stranger group in the expected direction on
all of the relationship measures. For example, compared to
the stranger participants, the friend participants reported being
closer to their partners [MF = 4.12, SDF = 0.96; MS = 1.08,
SDS = 0.28; t(86) = 18.33, p = 0.000] and knowing their part-
ners better [MF = 3.98, SDF = 1.02; MS = 1.00, SDS = 0.00;
t(86) = 17.52, p = 0.000], as well as their partners knowing
them better [MF = 3.92, SDF = 0.98; MS = 1.03, SDS = 0.17;
t(86) = 17.32, p = 0.000].
We examined the correlations among the STS and SVQ ratings
for the entire sample. Self-rated STS scores were highly corre-
lated with participants’ ratings of their partners, r(86) = 0.688,
p < 0.001. Similarly, self-rated SVQ scores were highly corre-
lated with participants’ ratings of their partners, r(86) = 0.695,
p < 0.001. These results suggest that participants assumed that
their own levels of self-talk were similar to the levels likely to
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be shown by their partners. In addition, self-rated STS and SVQ
scores were signiﬁcantly correlated, r(86) = 0.503, p < 0.001, as
were other-rated STS and SVQ scores, r(86) = 0.608, p < 0.001.
These results indicate substantial overlap between the two self-
talk measures.
The apeSTS scores for the entire sample (M = 21.63,
SD = 21.74) diﬀered signiﬁcantly from 0 (perfect accuracy),
t(87) = 9.33, p < 0.001, as did the apeSVQ scores (M = 23.86,
SD = 19.95), t(87) = 11.22, p < 0.001. These results indicated
that participants tended to rate themselves diﬀerently on self-talk
compared to how their partners rated them. The bias and dif-
ference scores for the entire sample did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from 0.
Comparison of Friend and Stranger Conditions
Table 4 presents data for the self-talk measures. As the table indi-
cates, comparison of the two groups on the accuracy measures
revealed one signiﬁcant diﬀerence – the friend group showed
larger average percentage error scores than the stranger group
for the STS. This ﬁnding was opposite to what we expected.
Because we failed to ﬁnd any diﬀerences on the bias or diﬀer-
ence measures, the apeSTS results suggest that participants in the
friend condition were generally less accurate in rating their part-
ner’s self-reported self-talk frequency than those in the stranger
condition, but not in a speciﬁc (over- or under-reporting) direc-
tion. Separate paired-sample t-tests for each group indicated that
the friend group did not diﬀer in their self- and other-ratings
on the STS or SVQ. However, the stranger group reported sig-
niﬁcantly higher self-ratings (Ms = 58.19, SDs = 8.44) than
other-ratings (Mo = 54.81, SDo = 7.36) for the STS, t(35) = 2.66,
p= 0.012. Strangers also reported signiﬁcantly higher self-ratings
(Ms = 125.44, SDs = 21.74) than other ratings (Mo = 117.42,
SDo = 21.22) for the SVQ, t(35) = 2.66, p = 0.012. Thus,
there was a tendency toward more frequent self-rated self-
talk than other-rated self-talk for the strangers but not for the
friends.
TABLE 4 | Study 3: Comparison of friend and stranger groups on major
measures.
Friend (n = 52) Stranger (n = 36)
Mean SD Mean SD t p
STS Self 57.54 12.52 58.19 8.44 0.274 0.785
STS Other 56.94 11.87 54.81 7.36 0.959 0.340
SVQ Self 123.19 29.56 125.44 21.74 0.390 0.698
SVQ Other 122.88 28.73 117.42 21.22 0.972 0.334
apeSTS 25.76 26.19 15.65 10.65 2.192 0.031
biasSTS 4.79 36.60 −3.80 18.72 1.296 0.199
diffSTS −0.60 16.79 −3.31 10.86 0.852 0.397
apeSVQ 24.69 22.58 22.66 15.61 0.468 0.641
biasSVQ 4.83 33.28 −2.91 27.62 1.147 0.254
diffSVQ −0.31 31.76 −8.03 33.40 1.098 0.275
STS, Self-Talk Scale; SVQ, Self-Verbalization Questionnaire; “ape” denotes aver-
age percentage error between self and other; “bias” denotes general direction of
disagreement; “diff” refers to difference between total scores. Positive bias and diff
scores reflect higher other-reported self-talk.
Additional analyses examining only the friend group indi-
cated that level of closeness was unrelated to the vari-
ous accuracy scores (all ps > 0.28), that participants who
lived with their partner did not diﬀer from those who did
not live together on those measures (all ps > 0.55), and
that those in dating relationships did not diﬀer in their
accuracy scores from those in non-dating relationships (all
ps > 0.23). Thus, contrary to our prediction, relationship
closeness was unrelated to the degree of self-other self-talk
accuracy.
We also analyzed the correlations among the major mea-
sures separately for the two groups. For the friend group,
self-reported and other-rated scores were highly correlated
for both the STS [r(50) = 0.740, p < 0.001] and the SVQ
[r(50) = 0.727, p < 0.001]. For the stranger group, self-
reported and other-rated scores were also signiﬁcantly correlated
for both the STS [r(34) = 0.538, p = 0.001] and the SVQ
[r(34) = 0.644, p < 0.001]. However, the Fisher r-to-z transfor-
mation showed that the correlations did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
for either the STS (z = 1.55, p = 0.12) or the SVQ (z = 0.70,
p = 0.48).
In summary, we found no evidence that people who know
others well showed greater accuracy in rating their part-
ner’s typical self-talk levels than did complete strangers. In
fact, friends were less accurate in rating their partner’s self-
reported self-talk frequency than were strangers. There was
also no support for the prediction of greater self-other agree-
ment with the private speech measure compared to the STS.
The results suggest that when people rate others who they
know on their self-talk levels, the raters may be relying
more on their assumptions about their partner’s typical self-
talk than on behavioral observations of the phenomenon. The
results are similar to the ﬁndings of Carlson et al. (2013),
who found that self-reported internalizing personality charac-
teristics were more accurate than informant reports of those
characteristics.
All participants seemed to have assumed that their partners
talk to themselves as frequently or infrequently as the participants
themselves do. There was a tendency toward greater similarity in
self-talk scores among friends than strangers. Thus, the greater
inaccuracy shown by the friends might be attributable to their
assumption that their partners were more similar to themselves
than what the strangers assumed about their randomly assigned
partners.
This study focused on the question of the agreement between
self- and other-reports of self-talk frequency. Results were sim-
ilar for both self-talk measures. With respect to the validity
of the STS or SVQ, it appears that talking to oneself either
silently or aloud is not a behavior that friends can accurately
assess. The results suggest that relying on other-reports of self-
talk frequency is not an eﬀective way to determine the validity
of self-talk measures. It is likely that instances of observing or
learning about a friend’s self-talk episodes are infrequent; future
research examining the nature and extent of friends’ knowl-
edge of their partner’s self-talk would provide additional insight
into the relationship between self- and other-reports of self-talk
frequency.
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General Discussion
The purpose of this set of studies was to determine the accu-
racy of STS scores. Results from the ﬁrst two studies provided
good support for the argument that self-reports of typical lev-
els of self-talk frequency correspond well with recent situations
where participants reported that self-talk had occurred. In partic-
ular, Study 1 results showed that respondents’ STS scores were
consistent with their reports about speciﬁc recent experiences
where self-talk occurred. The results from Study 2 showed that
frequent self-talkers were more likely to report having talked to
themselves when STS-related situations occurred, compared to
infrequent self-talkers. Study 3 ﬁndings indicated that people who
knew each other well were less accurate in their assessments of
their partner’s typical self-talk frequency than were strangers. The
latter ﬁndings indicate that there may be reasons to doubt the
accuracy of knowledgeable informants’ assessments of another’s
typical self-talk.
Consideration of the STS subscales revealed some inter-
esting patterns and diﬀerences. In Study 1, all the STS sub-
scales were signiﬁcantly correlated with reports of the occur-
rence of self-talk in recent situations. However, in Study
2, self-reported self-critical and social-assessing self-talk fre-
quency were similar for frequent and infrequent self-talkers.
Individuals appear to have less diﬃculty in accurately judg-
ing their typical self-reinforcing self-talk frequency than more
negative self-talk. It may be the case that self-reinforcing self-
talk is associated with less internal conﬂict or fewer alterna-
tive interpretations compared to self-critical or social-assessing
self-talk. It is also the case that some STS items refer explic-
itly to self-talk about communicating with others (e.g., social-
assessing and self-managing items pertaining to what the respon-
dent should do or say). Self-talk that pertains to talking with
others may be qualitatively diﬀerent from self-talk pertain-
ing to purely intrapersonal situations. Research on the phe-
nomenological and social interaction aspects of diﬀerent kinds
of self-talk would be an interesting extension of the current
ﬁndings.
There is a great deal of research documenting that a lack
of insight is characteristic of many mental disorders (Oltmanns
and Powers, 2012). The distinction between ego-dystonic (per-
sonal characteristics that conﬂict with one’s self-image) and
ego-syntonic (characteristics that are consistent with one’s self-
image) is also relevant to the question of how people view their
self-talk. As Oltmanns and Powers (2012) noted, many men-
tal disorders are ego-dystonic, whereas most personality disor-
ders are ego-syntonic. If people consider talking to themselves
as an indication of a mental disorder, they may under-report
its frequency. If, however, they view self-talk as a personality
characteristic (as seems to be the case based on the present
ﬁndings), they should be less inclined to under-report its fre-
quency. In the present set of studies, we did not examine
participants’ beliefs about or perceptions of the phenomenon
of self-talk. The results from Study 3 suggest that self-talk
is viewed by people as ego-syntonic. Addressing how people
view the phenomenon of self-talk (e.g., their stereotypes or
assumptions about it) and how those perceptions are related
to their self-reported frequency is a promising area for future
research.
Another direction for future research would be to manipu-
late the description of the phenomenon of self-talk when it is
being measured. For instance, the instructions for the STS state
that “[r]esearchers have determined that all people talk to them-
selves, at least in some situations or under certain circumstances.”
The perceived appropriateness of talking to oneself may aﬀect the
self-reported nature and frequency of self-talk. We would expect
that, if informing respondents that researchers have determined
that “mentally disturbed people talk to themselves,” signiﬁcant
under-reporting of self-talk frequency would likely occur.
The question of why people show individual diﬀerences in
self-reports of self-talk frequency is an intriguing one. Early
childhood experiences might contribute to such diﬀerences (e.g.,
Brinthaupt and Dove, 2012). Self-reports of self-talk might also
reﬂect respondents’ awareness of the situations where self-talk
occurs. Individual diﬀerences in the motivation to recognize or
acknowledge one’s self-talk might account for some of the dif-
ferences in STS scores (see Chin et al., 2012). Future research
could help to determine the extent to which self-reports of self-
talk reﬂect actual frequency diﬀerences rather than diﬀerences
due to beliefs or motivations with respect to this inner experience.
In their critique of ESM and questionnaire approaches to
studying inner experience, Hurlburt and Heavey (2015, p. 156)
note that how people answer the prompts or rate the scale items
is likely to be a generalization based on “an unspeciﬁed mixture
of heuristic (recency, availability, etc.), supposition, conﬁrmation
bias, and so on.” A more accurate understanding of the STS and
the present results would be to note that the STS is a measure of
whether people notice talking to themselves and how often they
recall doing so upon reﬂection. The present results refer more
to respondents’ interpretations of “experience and generalities”
(Hurlburt and Heavey, 2015, p. 156) than actual, ongoing expe-
riences of talking to themselves. Of course, the methods used in
the present studies were designed to assess the validity of the STS
rather than the nature and content of currently ongoing self-talk.
Based on the results, researchers who use the STS can be conﬁdent
that its scores are related to respondents’ self-reported instances
of talking to themselves across diﬀerent situations. The extent to
which the scores on the STS correspond to actual instances of
“pristine” inner experiences remains to be seen.
Taken together, the current ﬁndings indicate that general self-
reported STS scores are good approximations of speciﬁc reports
of self-talk. Combined with other research supporting the psy-
chometric properties of the STS, the research reported here pro-
vides evidence that this measure of self-talk frequency can be used
successfully to study individual diﬀerences in the phenomenon of
self-talk.
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